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The Representation of Victimhood in Sofi Oksanen’s Novel Purge 
 
Abstract 
 
Finnish-Estonian author Sofi Oksanen’s novel Purge (2008) explores one woman’s 
experience of political violence and its repercussions in Estonia from the 1930s to the 
1990s. The novel’s reception in Estonia included accusations that the text painted a 
simplified version of history, setting ‘good’ Estonian victims against ‘bad’ Russian 
perpetrators. However, a close reading of the text shows a much more complex and 
subtle representation of victimhood, which challenges such dichotomies. Seen in the 
context of current scholarly debates about the meaning of victimhood in contemporary 
society, the novel offers a warning against the contemporary nationalist tendency to 
found political community on a shared experience of suffering or persecution which 
excludes others, pointing instead to the creation of solidarities among different kinds of 
victims, which potentially transcend national boundaries. 
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Introduction 
 
Finnish-Estonian author Sofi Oksanen’s novel Purge (2008), based on her earlier play of 
the same name, has been widely translated and has been the subject of positive 
reception both in Finland itself and in the rest of Europe and the United States. The 
novel focuses on the suffering of three generations of Estonian women against a 
background of political change from the 1930s to the 1990s. The novel’s focus on 
continuities of female suffering in different historical contexts marks it out as a feminist 
text. However, in this article I will argue that the novel can also be read as a meditation 
on the function of suffering in the construction of political community, particular of the 
national variety. Iain Wilkinson has suggested that human suffering always ‘takes place 
within a cultural struggle to constitute our lives with positive meaning’ (Wilkinson, 
2004: 41). Such ‘positive meaning’ takes place at a collective level, in which groups and 
societies stake a claim to shared values and shared understandings both of themselves 
and their relationship to others in terms of the significance they invest in past suffering, 
particularly in terms of their conception of the victim of historical injustice as a key 
figure in their construction of political community. As I will argue below, Oksanen’s 
Purge is of interest precisely because of the critical way in which it questions this 
process, especially when applied to the context of post-communist Estonia, pointing 
towards alternative forms of solidarity which transcend the national community 
conceived as a community of victims. 
Oksanen’s novel focuses primarily on the lives of Aliide Truu, an Estonian peasant 
woman, and her great-niece Zara Pekk. Aliide’s story is related from 1936, that is to say 
towards the end of Estonia’s brief period of independence, whereas Zara’s story is told 
from 1991 onwards. Both of the women suffer sexual violence: Aliide during 
interrogations by the secret police in the Estonian Soviet Republic (ESSR) in the early 
post-war period, Zara at the hands of a Russian pimp who forces her into sexual slavery 
in Germany following the collapse of communism. Zara and Aliide meet for the first 
time in the early 1990s, as Zara tries to escape from her persecutor, making her way 
back to her mother’s and grandmother’s home village, from which they were banished 
to Vladivostock in 1949 for alleged crimes against socialism. As we later learn, this 
banishment, although part of a wave of historic deportations in March of that year, was 
also the result of a denunciation by Aliide herself, who was by then married to a 
committed communist, Martin Truu. The chief cause of Aliide’s hatred for her sister 
Ingel, who later becomes Zara’s grandmother, is the latter’s marriage to Hans Pekk, the 
only man Aliide is able to love. Hans is a member of the anti-Soviet partisan group the 
Forest Brothers, and briefly fights on the German side as Hitler’s Wehrmacht enters 
Estonia to drive out Soviet forces in 1941. Later, he returns to his village, and is hidden 
by Aliide and Ingel in a secret room in their house. Following Ingel’s deportation with 
her daughter, Linda, Aliide continues to live in the family house with her husband, 
Martin, while still concealing Hans. Eventually, however, it becomes clear to her that 
Hans will never love her and, when he dangerously begins to lose control of himself, 
Aliide drugs and smothers him. Years later, when Zara returns to the village and seeks 
Aliide’s protection from her Russian pimp, Pasha, and his henchman, former KGB 
officer Lavrenti, Aliide once more turns to violence, shooting both men and giving the 
money they are carrying to Zara so that she can escape home to Vladivostok. Aliide 
herself plans to burn the house with herself in it. 
As the summary above demonstrates, this is novel full of incident and drama, 
arguably even melodramatic in its construction. In part due to these features, the novel’s 
positive reception outside of Estonia was followed by widespread and controversial 
debate in the national press once the Estonian translation was published. As Eneken 
Laanes has observed, the criticisms of the book inside Estonia focused on three key 
areas: Firstly, that the book presented an overly dark portrayal of Estonia under state 
socialism per se (a curious charge given that the book only really deals with the ESSR 
until the early 1950s); Secondly, that it was calculated to appeal to an international 
market with its allegedly salacious portrayals of sexual violence, and by use of a 
popular thriller format (a comparison with Dan Brown was drawn by one critic); 
Thirdly, that it pushed an anti-Russian agenda by portraying a black-and-white division 
between Soviet ‘baddies’ and Estonian ‘goodies’, appealing to a nationalist agenda both 
in Estonia itself and in the author’s native Finland (Laanes, 2012: 20). 
In order to investigate Oksanen’s portrayal of victimhood, I will conduct a close 
reading of the text, triangulating my analysis both with the criticisms put forward in the 
Estonian debate on the book, and with a growing literature on the significance of the 
figure of the victim in the politics of memory and in contemporary culture more 
generally. My argument about Oksanen’s novel will be that, in exploiting the 
conventions of popular literature with its melodramatic plot twists, coincidences and 
portrayals of extremes of experience, the text is able to engage in complex portrayals of 
victimhood and suffering which undermine those very black-and-white distinctions 
which its critics claim to identify. Rather than drawing clear lines between victims and 
perpetrators, particularly as this applies to Estonia between the 1930s and the 1950s, 
Oksanen’s text can be read as challenging contemporary instrumentalisations of 
victimhood, especially as they apply to the legacy of communism in Europe. 
 
The Meaning of Victimhood 
 
Before engaging in a reading of Purge, it is necessary to interrogate our contemporary 
understanding of what it means to have been the victim of political violence –  whether 
in the form of human rights abuses, war crimes or even genocide – and of the duty of 
others to remember that victimhood – for example, through compensation, 
rehabilitation, or memorialisation – can be traced back to the emergence of a number of 
trends in the 1970s. The post-1968 period saw the emergence of social movements in 
the West whose focus was the suffering of particular social groups, for example women 
or homosexuals. The claim to membership of a persecuted minority group became both 
the potential source of a shared identity, which could galvanise resistance to oppression, 
and also a powerful political demand to state and society for the removal of the 
conditions of oppression. This trope is today so well-established that we see groups who 
oppose these very same demands for liberation seeking to adopt victim status: So, 
conservative Christians who actively oppose equal rights for homosexuals or the right to 
choose for women cast themselves as an ‘oppressed minority’, persecuted not just 
because of their beliefs, but because of who they are. This development highlights the 
key difference which the notion of victimhood makes between human suffering in 
general and victim status in particular. Historically speaking, it is only a relatively 
recent development that human beings have perceived their suffering as the outcome of 
a particular social order or of a political power which could be modified or overthrown. 
As Joseph A. Amato argues, modernity is characterised by a belief that happiness and 
well-being are both attainable and to be expected (Amato, 1990: xix). Thus, by 
implication, suffering comes to seem anomalous and in need of remedy. The social 
movements which often support and, in some cases, are founded in the claim to victim 
status can therefore be regarded as quintessentially modern phenomena, products of 
societies which, as Dieter Rucht (2004) puts it, come to see human action as having the 
potential to re-order social existence for the better, as opposed to attributing that order to 
a divine and unchangeable will. 
The 1970s also saw the emergence of a human rights agenda in national and 
international politics. As détente between the two super powers began to falter in the 
middle of the decade, the denial of human rights to citizens of state socialist countries 
became a means for the West to apply pressure to the Soviet Union and its satellite 
states, often supported by emerging human rights NGOs, and indeed by dissidents 
within those countries who adopted a human rights agenda in challenging the legitimacy 
of communist governments (Moyn, 2010: 121–75) . The suffering of those imprisoned 
and persecuted by these governments became a powerful symbol of their lack of 
legitimacy and their claim to represent a more humane form of social organisation. At 
the opposite end of the political spectrum, human rights activists in Latin American 
countries and their supporters abroad increasingly used the publicisation of human 
rights abuses under ring-wing authoritarian regimes in a similar fashion. This is not to 
say that the notion of human rights, which emerged in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, was invented at this point in time; only that, as Moyn has argued, it was in 
the 1970s that the belief that sovereign states could be held to account by the 
international community for their breaches of human rights gained currency (Moyn, 
2010: 212). As Paige Arthur observes in the case of Latin America, once the regimes in 
question had fallen, human rights activists at the national level could continue to assert 
their relevance to the political process by framing themselves as defenders of the 
memory of persecution, with the figure of the victim of the now defunct dictatorship 
acting as a kind of guarantor of the new democratic order (2009: 334-35). The notion of 
transitional justice, which gained significant attention in this context, is an expression of 
the belief that the suffering of the victims must be addressed in order for the new society 
to flourish: Their suffering has by no means come to an end simply because the cause 
(the previous dictatorship) has been removed. This is not to suggest, however, that such 
claims to victimhood go unchallenged. As James Mark’s analysis of central and eastern 
European countries after the demise of state socialism demonstrates, recognition of 
victim status and measures to address that status can be patchy and uneven, depending 
on national political conditions (Mark, 2010). 
The construction of victimhood as a form of continued suffering which demands 
redress beyond the removal of the political system which caused it can also be seen in 
the context of the development of the diagnosis of trauma in the late 20th century. As 
Didier Fassin and Richard Reitman have argued, in the post-war period, psychiatric 
symptoms of trauma have increasingly become associated with the status of the victim, 
to the extent that psychiatrists are now asked to attest to such symptoms in order to 
‘prove’ that an individual has been subjected to violent treatment, especially in the case 
of asylum seekers (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009). In other words, to be perceived as a 
‘victim’ worthy of protection and redress, there is an assumption that the violence 
inflicted must have left psychological scars of a particular kind which come to stand in 
for the violence itself. By implication, then, someone who was violently attacked, and 
who was in danger of suffering similar treatment again, only really becomes a victim 
when they have they display typically victim-like symptoms of trauma: Trauma and 
victimhood become more or less interchangeable. However, the notion of trauma also 
expresses a continued demand for action on the part of the state and society. It is a way 
of expressing the fact that victims still suffer after the cause of the original persecution 
is removed and that others have a moral obligation to put in place measures which 
would in some way address that continued suffering, particularly by offering material 
support and social recognition. 
The assumption of the victim’s ongoing suffering (connoted as trauma) and the 
importance of addressing their needs in political terms (demonstrating commitment to 
democracy and human rights) find their most compelling expression in the figure of the 
Holocaust victim. The duty to remember the Holocaust and its victims, both those who 
survived the horror and those who did not, increasingly became a focus of attention in 
Western Europe and the United States following the Eichmann trial in the early 1960s, 
which gave prominence to survivor testimony above and beyond the need to establish 
the nature of Eichmann’s administrative activities. As Annette Wieviorka has observed 
(2006: 56), the Eichmann trial initiates the ‘era of witness’, in which the Holocaust 
survivor in particular offer a point of moral orientation for the contemporary world. By 
remembering their suffering in various ways, societies not only attempt to address their 
continued traumatic suffering, but also demonstrate their commitment to the lessons of 
that suffering in terms of the values of democracy and human rights. In a similar vein, 
Erica Bouris argues that the conception of victimhood which emerges from the context 
of the Holocaust is that of the ‘moral beacon’ (2007: 32). In other words, in order for 
victims to achieve recognition, it is often assumed that they must be portrayed as moral 
paragons as opposed to complex human beings. As a consequence, in debates over 
victimhood, commentators often set very high standards for the recognition of victim 
status. So, for example, there are those who, like John Elster, argue that it is not 
permissible to speak of particular victims in the context of state socialism, since all 
citizens were to a greater or lesser extent complicit in the system (Elster, 2004: 109–
110). As Bettina Greiner has pointed out in the context of the legacy of state socialism 
in Germany, this insistence on the ‘purity’ of victims can have the negative effect of 
making those who suffered under socialist regimes unwilling to acknowledge the 
implication of their nations in fascism and the suffering of that previous system’s 
victims (Greiner, 2006). Greiner’s analysis might equally be extended to a number of 
former socialist states in Eastern and Central Europe. 
This standard of absolute victimhood is problematic in terms of the criteria it sets for 
recognising victimhood in other contexts, since it is likely to blind us to real suffering 
where a norm of moral purity is not deemed to have been met, and may also make those 
involved in conflicts much less willing to acknowledge their own misdeeds because 
they want to attain for themselves the prestige position of the morally pure victim. 
Furthermore, the notion of the victim as ‘moral beacon’ can also make it more difficult 
to see the very nature of the evil which creates the victims’ suffering in the first place. 
Primo Levi, for example, was particularly strident in rejecting the notion that the 
Holocaust victim was in any way ‘sanctified’ by their experience. Rather, he argues, the 
concentration camp system tended to ‘degrade’ victims by placing them in a situation 
where they could no longer maintain their ‘moral armature’ (1989: 25). The brutality of 
the camps was such that victims were forced to make moral choices that, in other 
circumstances, they would have found appalling. In particular, Levi states, they are left 
with a sense of ‘shame’ for having omitted to help those weaker than themselves at the 
expense of their own survival (1989: 59). That shame is a key element of the 
concentration camp experience for Levi, which he does not wish to see forgotten. 
The importance of presenting the ‘impure’ victim, rather than a sanitised version of 
the victim as moral paragon, may well pre-date the Holocaust, however. For example, in 
her analysis of Linda Brent’s autobiographical account of life as a black slave in the 
American South, Elisabeth V. Spelman, points out the difficulty Brent consciously faces 
when relating her sexual exploitation by white men. On the one hand, Brent portrays her 
suffering with a particular political intent, that is to provoke outrage against the slavery 
system. On the other, however, she realises that to fully express the horror of that 
system she will have to talk about the way in which its degradation of her forced her to 
abandon her own moral standards and sleep with powerful white men to gain a minimal 
form of protection from worse treatment. She realises, Spelman points out, that this may 
lessen potential identification with her on the part of her audience, whose circumstances 
do not force them into such compromises (1997: 73-82). At the same time, Spelman 
argues, by refusing to present herself as a ‘pure’ victim, Brent also asserts her moral 
agency as someone who was still in a position to choose, even if the choice made was 
not one she can be proud of. By doing so, she maintains her status as the ‘moral equal’ 
of her reader (1997: 74): She is not merely a passive victim, but a moral agent forced to 
make choices in a horrific situation. A similar case could be made for Levi’s account. 
Although he makes clear that it was part of the horror of the concentration camp system 
that it placed him in the position of having to choose between self-preservation and 
solidarity, he also remembers that he did sometimes offer comfort to others, while at 
other times he did not. The fact that he describes the emotion associated with memories 
of not having helped as shameful indicates that he still feels that there was a choice 
involved: His shame is the feeling of not having lived up to what he believes to be his 
true moral standards. 
The accounts of victimhood offered by Brent and Levi suggest that the notion of the 
‘pure’ victim as ‘moral beacon’ may be problematic, in that it conceals from us the full 
magnitude of the crimes committed against victims in the context of slavery and the 
concentration camp system respectively. The morally ‘pure’ victim is simultaneously 
robbed of their moral agency and of a key aspect of their suffering, namely the agony of 
having to make moral choices under conditions of extreme oppression. It is possible to 
see an analogous danger where the condition of victim is extrapolated from the 
individual to the group level. Diane Enns has argued, for instance, that the conferment a 
morally pure status on victim groups, be they ethnic or national, has the deleterious 
effect of not only precluding any consideration of their moral judgements in the past, 
but also in the future. Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, Enns suggests that the 
assigning of a victim status to groups, which is assumed to continue into the future by 
virtue of the traumatic legacy of the past, effectively removes them from co-
responsibility from shaping that future (2012: 92), since they are unable to reflect on 
their own moral choices in that future. Placed in the role of victim, groups can only see 
themselves in terms of the recognition or non-recognition of that status, its non-
recognition being coterminous with a repetition of the violence they previously suffered. 
Particularly in situations where more than one group claims victim status, this leads to 
an inability to recognise the losses of others in which one may oneself have been 
complicit, since to do so would be to give up one’s own privileged position as ‘pure’ 
victim. At the same time, those who adopt the victim role may be unable to reflect upon 
their own actions in defence of their victimised selves. Enns’ argument is that the role of 
the victim, as we have come to understand it, precludes moral judgement both on the 
part of those who have suffered themselves and of them by others, which works against 
both a nuanced understanding of conflict and an ability to judge the wrongs and the 
harms on all sides (2012: 115). One might also add, as David Bruce Macdonald has 
demonstrated in his analysis of propaganda during the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia, that the power of the victim role is now such that it can also be cynically 
manipulated by objective aggressors in order to portray those they persecute on national 
or ethnic grounds as the real victimisers, against whom they are forced to defend 
themselves (2002). The logic here is that, once one has discursively constructed oneself 
in the role of the victim, it is impossible for anyone to question one’s actions, since one 
is a priori morally pure. Not only this, but, as Tzvetan Todorov has argued, victim status 
can also be politically advantageous, in that it limits the possible responses of others to 
the group’s demands: ‘Victimhood gives you grounds to complain, to protest, to make 
demands, and others have to respond, or else cut off relations entirely.’ (2003: 143) 
An important consequence of these various parallel developments is that political 
communities today are just as likely to look to experiences of suffering in the past to 
underpin a sense of collective identity as they might have been in the past to point to 
experiences of glory or heroism. Victimhood has acquired associations of moral purity 
which allow those who identify with this status (or with those who have this status) to 
assume a position which distinguishes them from those regarded as oppressors or 
perpetrators, who are seen as incapable of the suffering which is reserved for the victim 
group. At the same time, the desire to maintain a claim to victim status can lead to an 
unwillingness to see oneself as morally fallible or even as a subject whose actions are 
open to moral scrutiny.  As Judith Butler has argued in relation to the US reaction to 
September 11 2001, one of the unfortunate effects of this construction of righteous 
victimhood, especially as the basis of national community, is a ‘dis-identification’ with 
others whose human ability to suffer is not recognised (2004: 143). Instead, the 
exclusive claim to victim status can lead to a desire for violence against others, which (it 
is hoped) will re-instate the victim’s sense of invulnerability. In opposition to this, 
Butler proposes that suffering should, instead, be ‘mobilized in the service of a politics 
that seeks to diminish suffering universally, that seeks to recognise the sanctity of life, 
of all lives’, thereby potentially creating new forms of solidarity (2004: 104). 
 
Victimhood in the Estonian Context 
 
As Marek Tamm has argued, before the first Soviet invasion of 1939 and the demise of 
the Estonian Republic, constructions of Estonian national identity were dominated by a 
narrative of ‘national heroization’ centred on the struggle to overcome German 
domination (2008: 504). As the grip of the Soviet regime loosened in the late 1980s, 
nationalist memory activists embraced a narrative of restoration, envisioning a 
reestablishment of the inter-war republic which would signal an essential continuity 
with that original struggle for national self-liberation (2008: 505). In the 1990s, 
however, this heroic discourse was supplemented with an increased attention to the 
suffering of the Estonian people, whether through mass deportations (Tamm, 2013: 653) 
or other aspects of Soviet oppression within Estonia itself. Mieke Wulf has argued that, 
since independence, repression by the Soviet Union has come to dominate Estonian 
memory, with the German occupation, including its aspects of collaboration and the 
participation of some Estonians in the Holocaust, only gradually being brought onto the 
agenda, largely by the state in an attempt to re-align Estonia with a European memory 
agenda (2010: 251). The founding of a Museum of Occupations (at first privately, but 
now with state support) in 1993, which emphasises Estonian suffering and tends to elide 
complicity in the German war effort, was one symptom of this development. 
Bernd Giesen notes that victimhood and heroism are in fact compatible features 
of nationalist ideology, since both experiences, the traumatic and triumphant 
respectively, can be incorporated into the narrative of collective identity: Victims suffer 
for the sake of that collective identity and their trauma can be re-interpreted as 
bestowing upon them a kind of ‘triumphant immortality’ (2004: 25). This is clearly 
compatible with the contemporary notion of the victim whose suffering bears a moral 
lesson for the present and future. In the case of national victims, that lesson calls upon 
the next generation to remove the conditions of earlier sufferers’ persecution, that is to 
say to preserve national independence and not let their suffering have been in vain. 
Furthermore, by recognising the damage done to national victims, ‘a society tries to 
include them again in the community of human beings who […] are tied to each other 
by some bond of solidarity in distinction to others’ (2004: 48), thereby strengthening the 
nation’s sense of collective identity. In this way, the victim’s suffering body can become 
what Elaine Scarry calls an ‘analogical substantiation’ of the national community (1985: 
147–48). Perpetration, on the other hand, is not compatible with such heroic narratives 
of the nation, and perpetrators must therefore be recuperated as heroes (Giesen, 2004: 
25) so that their crimes do not call into question the moral purity of the nation as 
oppressed victim. 
In the Estonian context, this can be seen in the significant grass-roots support for 
the honouring of those Estonians who fought on the German side in the Second World 
War as ‘freedom fighters,’ a move which ignores the complexity of their collusion in the 
German war effort and its accompanying crimes against humanity (Wulf, 2010: 261). At 
the same time, the lines between good victims and heroes, on the one hand, and bad 
oppressors, on the other, must be neatly maintained, despite the fact that, as Wulf points 
out, ethnic Estonians also fought on the Soviet side. Again, the Estonia state has come 
under international pressure to contain celebration of Estonians who fought on the 
fascist side as it has become integrated into the EU and NATO (Mark, 2010: 111). 
As discussed in the introduction to this article, Sofi Oksanen’s novel Purge has 
itself been accused of peddling a version of Estonian history in which the Russians are 
the perpetrators and the Estonians the innocent victims or noble heroes. What I hope to 
show by means of a close reading of the text in what follows is that Oksanen actually 
focuses chiefly on Estonian nationals and explores their complex experience of 
suffering and complicity in the perpetration of suffering, which cannot be reduced to 
such a schematisation. At the same time, I will argue, Oksanen’s novel has an interest 
beyond the context of debates over Estonian history, in that it also interrogates the 
situation of the victim of political violence in order to dispense with the cliché of the 
victim as ‘moral beacon.’ Oksanen shows how to be a victim of violence and oppression 
can equally lead individuals into a defensive de-solidarisation of the kind described by 
Butler, which can include collusion in the same structures which harmed them. In doing 
so, Oksanen questions the possibility of founding political community on a sense of 
shared righteous victimhood, pointing instead to the potential of recognising a shared 
human (as opposed to merely national) condition of vulnerability and moral fallibility as 
a way out of violence and isolation, both on the individual and on the national level. 
 
Victimhood in Purge 
 
The central narrative of those sections of Purge which deal with Estonia under German 
and Soviet occupation during the Second World War and its aftermath are dominated by 
Aliide Truu’s love for Estonian nationalist Hans Pekk. The story is, in fact, closely 
focalised around Aliide’s experience, so that, despite the third person narration, we have 
remarkably little historical or political context for her decisions and actions. The reader 
sees the world as Aliide sees it, a perspective whose only contrasts are located in a 
series of fictional documents inserted by the author into the narrative at various points, 
and in the narrative centred on Zara’s experiences in the 1990s. The book’s five parts, 
constructed of short chapters arranged in non-chronological order, are intercalated with 
pages from a diary kept by Hans while in hiding from the communist authorities, with 
the final part being made up of files from an unnamed branch of the secret police 
(presumably the Soviet NKWD) from 1946 to 1951. Whereas this final section reveals 
information about the post-war period which none of the characters is party to in its 
entirety, and which therefore adds further context for the reader to re-assess what has 
happened, Hans’ diary entries almost comically point out the mis-perceptions which 
characterise Aliide’s assessment of her situation. For example, whereas our first glimpse 
of Hans before the war is shown through the eyes of Aliide’s, who sees him surrounded 
by ‘sunshine’ and ‘bright light’ (Oksanen, 2010: 115), Aliide herself remains unaware of 
Hans’ contempt for her, which he hides only because he later depends on her for his 
survival (113). From the very beginning of the family’s story in 1936, her only goal is to 
be with Hans and to usurp her sister’s place is his affections. The only attention she pays 
to the world outside the village and the wider political situation is directed by Hans, 
when he asks her to protect Ingel during his absence after the Soviet invasion in 1940 as 
he goes to hide in the woods: ‘Aliide couldn’t betray Hans’ trust, she had to be worthy 
of him. That’s why she started to follow the news of the war from Finland with sharp 
eyes and keen ears, like Hans used to do.’ (128) Although she questions Hans about his 
activities fighting alongside German forces, she has no real sense of what he might have 
seen and done, which he considers to be ‘things […] that you shouldn’t tell to a woman’ 
(226). Equally, although Aliide registers the disappearance of a Jewish family from the 
village, she does not seem to think it worth questioning the generally held supposition 
that they have ‘escaped to the Soviet Union for safety’ (136). In this way, Oksanen 
emphases the extent to which Aliide’s experience of the world is filtered through her 
project of winning Hans for herself, to the exclusion of wider political understanding of 
the history she lives through. 
Her commitment to that personal project leads her to become a victim of extreme 
violence and also a perpetrator of it. It is her refusal to give the authorities details of 
Hans’ whereabouts after the establishment of the ESSR in 1940 that leads to her 
interrogation and (the text implies) rape in 1947 (151-153). This scene, which occurs 
not quite at the mid-point of the novel, can be said to be central to the story in a number 
of senses. Firstly, it establishes a motive for Aliide’s later marriage to Estonian 
communist Martin Truu. As the reader later learns, Aliide’s identification of Martin as a 
man who can provide her with protection is deeply ironic, given that the secret police 
documents included in the final section of the book show that he is present in the cellar 
on the night that Aliide is assaulted (379) and that he provided information which led to 
her interrogation in the first place (378). Nevertheless, marriage to Martin later provides 
Aliide with a sense that she will be protected from such violence in the future, and also 
that nobody will suspect what has happened to her if she is married to a communist: ‘No 
one would dare, because she was Martin Truu’s wife, she was a respectable woman.’ 
(168) Although Aliide believes she can recognise other women who have similarly 
suffered sexual violence, her efforts are directed towards maintaining her distance from 
them rather than establishing any kind of solidarity with them (168). From the very 
beginning of the narrative, Aliide experiences the world as essentially hostile and her 
existence in it as vulnerable in Judith Butler’s sense (2004: 150). This basic fact of her 
relationship to her environment is captured in Oksanen’s use of the symbol of the fly, 
which first appears when Aliide and Ingel meet Hans for the first time outside the 
church. Losing control of the situation to her sister, Aliide experiences the world as 
overpowering: ‘The heel of her shoe dug into the earth again and again, but the earth 
betrayed her, the spruce trees gave way, the grass slid under her, the stones rolled away 
under her feet, and a horsefly flew into her mouth’ (116). The reappearance of the fly 
during the interrogation in the cellar, when Aliide has a bag over her head and is tied up, 
re-emphasises this fear of loss of control, which is also echoed in the older Aliide’s 
domestic habits as portrayed at the beginning of the novel: In the opening pages, we 
find her hunting down a fly that has made its way into her kitchen, and which she 
experiences as a threat to the order she has created in the house. This order is also 
expressed by the constant bottling and pickling which the elderly Aliide engages in, the 
aim of which is to achieve self-sufficiency from the hostile external environment. It is 
worth noting here that Aliide sees ‘self-control’ (5) as the key to her survival. 
From the above, it should be clear that political matters are very much subordinated 
to personal concerns in Aliide’s life. Although she is undoubtedly tortured and 
humiliated by the Soviet authorities, her refusal to betray Hans to them is not motivated 
by support of his political cause or feelings of Estonian nationalism, but by her desire to 
win him back from her sister, Ingel. By taking control of Hans’ situation, Aliide hopes 
to reverse the power relationship between her and her older sister, who seems incapable 
of negotiating the complex new political situation. Whereas the narrative begins with 
Ingel’s humiliation of Aliide, who is also constantly reminded of her inferior domestic 
skills by her sister, after the Soviet invasion Aliide sees Ingel as the hopeless one: ‘What 
a stupid girl. Aliide didn’t understand how Hans could have chosen a woman like her.’ 
(140) Similarly, her collaboration with the new Soviet regime places her in a position of 
power over others in the community, which not only means that they will not regard her 
as a victim of the political system, but that they must also learn to fear her. The 
exhilaration she feels, for example, after she learns that Ingel and Linda are to be 
deported is symptomatic of this need to dominate others as an antidote to her own 
vulnerability. Here she fantasises that she could consign the Roosipuus family, with 
whom she and Martin are sharing a house at the time, to the same fate as her sister and 
niece. 
 
A sudden, shameful joy spread through her chest. She was alive. She had 
survived. Her name wasn’t on the lists. No one could bear false witness against 
her, not against Martin’s wife, but she could send away the Roosipuus to where 
Estonian soil was just a faraway memory. (186) 
 
She then returns to the house and threatens the family with denunciation if they do 
not remove their picture of Jesus from the bedroom wall. It is only at the end of the 
novel that we discover the full extent of Aliide’s need to dominate others, when the 
secret police documents reveal that, far from merely hearing of the news of Ingel and 
Linda’s deportation, Aliide has in fact been instrumental in their being removed, 
presumably in order to achieve exclusive access to Hans (383). The codename which 
has been chosen for Aliide in her work for the secret police is highly significant here: 
Named ‘Agent “Fly”’, Aliide’s desire for mastery over others is linked here, through 
reference to the symbolism of the fly discussed above, to her sense of her own 
vulnerability. This move on her part chimes with concerns expressed in different 
contexts by both Butler and Enns that, despite the dominant conception of the victim as 
a figure whose suffering leads to a kind of moral elevation and insight, those who have 
suffered violence can seek to remedy their sense of vulnerability through recourse to 
violence and domination of others. 
In Aliide’s case, this extends to a sense of disgust towards fellow victims, whose 
vulnerability is seen as potentially contaminating, whether it is expressed in the visible 
fear of other women who have been assaulted, or in the traumatic symptoms of her 
niece, Linda. Linda’s fate is particularly disturbing since she is both a victim like Aliide 
and arguably Aliide’s victim, in that Aliide submits to torturing Linda herself rather than 
betray Hans. Clearly, the situation portrayed is highly ambiguous from an ethical point 
of view: The choice between betraying Hans and torturing Linda is one produced by the 
oppressive political regime, and the fact of Aliide’s having to choose between these two 
horrific outcomes therefore reveals above all the brutality of the system. Yet, as in the 
examples of Levi’s and Brent’s stories discussed above, Aliide nevertheless remains a 
moral agent in this situation. Furthermore, her ultimate choice is motivated by her 
personal desire to finally win Hans from her sister. It is for that reason only that she 
wants to keep him alive, and for that reason only that she chooses Linda’s pain over his. 
Finally, Linda comes to represent not an object of sympathy or identification for Aliide, 
but rather symbolises her own vulnerable body, a body from which she wishes to 
disassociate herself: ‘She didn’t want to touch that creature, and she was disgusted; she 
detested her own body and Linda’s body and the thin, waxy coating that had appeared 
on her skin.’ (180) 
This dissociation from one’s own body is also a key element of the interrogation 
scene in the cellar, a fact which further emphasises the importance of this moment for 
the development of the narrative. Aliide survives her mistreatment through an out-of-
body experience, in which she at first becomes a ‘mouse, in the corner of the room’, 
then a ‘fly […] walking over a woman’s naked breast’ (151). Aliide ceases to identify 
with ‘the woman’ who is herself and thereby also ceases to identify with other victims, 
for whom she can only feel contempt. This situation changes, however, when she 
encounters her great-niece, Zara, who she finds lying in the rain outside her house in 
1992. Zara’s fear allows Aliide to experience her own fear for the first time, breaking 
through the defences she has built up against it: 
 
Good god, how her body remembered that feeling, remembered it so well that 
she caught the feeling as soon as she saw it in a stranger’s eyes. […] Aliide’s 
ability to fear was something that should have belonged to the past. […] But 
now, when an unknown girl was in her kitchen spreading the fear from her bare 
skin onto Aliide’s oilcoth, she couldn’t brush it away like she ought to have done. 
(79) 
 Zara’s experience of sexual exploitation by Pasha and Lavrenti during her time in 
Berlin, which involves rape by the former of the two men, forced prostitution and 
forced participation in the filming of pornography, is described in shocking detail in the 
novel. At the same time, Oksanen reveals parallels between Aliide’s response to torture 
and Zara’s to sexual abuse. Zara becomes the object of the desire of others, losing her 
identity to the fictional figure of the prostitute ‘Natasha,’ whose role she plays for her 
customers (72–73). However, this enforced estrangement from her own body and her 
own name also becomes a means by which Zara can survive. So, for example, when she 
is shown one of the videos that Pasha has made of her, she is able to feel that ‘the video 
was not Zara’s story but Natasha’s; it would never be Zara’s story. Natasha’s story was 
on the video. Zara’s was someplace else.’ (237) This ability to see her body as 
something alien finally allows her to commit the act of violence which secures her 
freedom, when she murders a rich client: 
 
She had been made to look at her own body so much that it was strange to her. 
Maybe a strange body worked better than her own body in some situations. 
Maybe that is why it had gone so well. (279) 
 
Here Zara experiences, in a way that Aliide does not seem to do, the ambivalence of a 
self-alienated position which allows sufficient emotional detachment to be able to do 
violence to others. It is hard to imagine any reader regarding the odious client to be in 
any way Zara’s victim, and Oksanen portrays him as both physically repulsive and 
sadistic to underline this. Nevertheless, her determination to survive both through a dis-
identification with her own suffering and the use of violence against others allows her to 
be seen as a parallel figure to Aliide. What is striking, however, is that Aliide’s exposure 
to Zara’s fear, her recognition of their common experience of abuse and helplessness, 
translates in this case not into contempt for the weaker figure on Aliide’s part, or an 
attempt to distance herself from that weakness in order to preserve her own 
invulnerability, but rather into a desire to protect the younger woman and an experience 
of solidarity with her. 
This shift in Aliide’s attitude is not immediate. Indeed, as late in the narrative as 
Pasha and Lavrenti’s arrival in the village, Aliide’s feelings towards Zara oscillate 
between identification and revulsion at her weakness: 
 
Had she looked like that back then? Had she held an arm in from of her breasts, 
been frightened by trivial things, looked wildly about at every sudden noise? Her 
stomach turned with disgust at the girl again. (300) 
 
However, after Pasha and Lavrenti have shown Aliide pornographic pictures of Zara, 
Aliide achieves identification with her great-niece when she imagines what it would be 
like for Zara if people back home saw the images, clearly over-laying Zara’s 
predicament with her own fear of being recognised as a victim in her own community: 
 
‘And you would never know, when you passed those people on the street, if 
they had seen those pictures. They would look at you, and you would never 
know if you’d been recognized. They would be laughing among themselves and 
looking in your direction, and you wouldn’t know if they were talking about 
you.’ 
Aliide shut her mouth. What was she talking about? The girl stared at her. 
(336) 
 
In terms of the chronology of the narrative, it is immediately following this moment 
of identification that Aliide shoots Pasha and Lavrenti as they return to her house, 
providing Zara with the money they are carrying for her to return home. The end of the 
narrative, when Aliide remains behind and plans to burn the house while she lies next to 
Hans’ body under the floorboards, is not a neat resolution in the sense that Aliide’s self-
sacrifice may also be interpreted as a resignation in the face of a history of brutality, 
which merely seems to repeat itself: ‘there would always be chrome-tanned boots, some 
new boots would arrive, the same or different, but a boot on your neck nevertheless’ 
(325). At the same time, however, we see Aliide able to relinquish her long-standing 
response to victimhood, namely that of a defensive subjectivity which seeks to hold the 
chaotic outside world at bay by any means available, and by resorting to violence 
against or rejection of the similarly vulnerable where necessary. It should also be noted 
that this ‘dis-identification’, as Butler terms it, has gone hand-in-hand with Aliide’s 
commitment to the communist cause. What begins as a pragmatic move to protect 
herself from denunciation clearly becomes a source of identification for her, which 
places her in the category of ‘good Communist’ (107), even after the regime has fallen. 
This allows her both to see who suffer under the regime as morally culpable, i.e. not 
‘good Communists’ like herself, and simultaneously frees her from the need to 
interrogate her own behaviour to those she has harmed.  
This experience of the victim becoming the perpetrator is by no means confined to 
Aliide’s biography. The same is also the case, as we discover in the final section of the 
book, for her husband, Martin Truu, who, while also having been complicit in Aliide’s 
rape, is motivated to collaborate with the NKWD in order to rehabilitate himself after 
his contact with his Western émigré brother is discovered (363). Nevertheless, like 
Aliide, he eventually becomes highly committed to the regime. Even Zara must at times 
become complicit with her abusers to survive, watching other girls being herded into a 
truck before she rides with Pasha and Lavrenti in their limousine, at her suggestion, into 
Estonia. 
Oksanen’s novel therefore arguably blurs the distinction between victims and 
perpetrators in such a way as to destabilise any Estonian national identity based on the 
notion of a shared righteous victimhood. Far from drawing a binary distinction between 
Soviet baddies and Estonian goodies, as critics of the novel have averred, the suffering 
of Estonians is shown not to translate automatically into noble resistance, but is rather 
shown to undermine their solidarity with each other in the struggle for individual 
survival. While this might be read as a kind of victim-blaming, it is also significant in 
terms of the way in which it undermines contemporary Estonian nationalist narratives of 
heroic Estonian resistance and victimhood, which blot out any consideration of Estonian 
culpability, not least in relation to the Holocaust, but also in terms of their 
accommodation with the Soviet regime. While the suffering of individual Estonians is 
shown in Oksanen’s novel, primarily in the case of Aliide, the possibility of a 
community of suffering bound together by shared ‘pure’ victim status, setting them 
apart from Russians as a perpetrator group, is thrown into doubt. In this sense, it is 
problematic to read Oksanen’s as a nationalist text, a point of view also undermined by 
the portrayal of Hans Pekk, who we learn has murdered Martin Truu’s brother. Unlike 
the acts of violence in which Martin or, indeed, Aliide are complicit, it is difficult to 
explain Hans’ actions in terms of his own victimhood. Rather, it seems to be purely 
ideologically motivated: ‘A Communist. I strangled him.’ (359) The fact that Martin’s 
brother is a hunted, confused and dishevelled figure, on the run from the new Soviet 
regime himself, further casts a negative light on Hans’ violence. Structuring his thinking 
about the world according to fixed categories of moral victims (Estonian nationalists) 
and immoral perpetrators (communists) allows him to kill Martin’s brother without 
recognising their shared condition of vulnerability across ideological lines at this time 
of political upheaval. 
The kind of solidarity which the novel does seem to support, however, is one based 
on an ‘apprehension of a common human vulnerability’, as Judith Butler puts it (2004: 
30). We see this in the developing relationship between Zara and Aliide, in which Aliide 
is able to give up her dis-identification with her own former suffering and with others 
who suffer in order to act in a way which shows solidarity with Zara (a Russian), 
recognising the commonalities of their experience despite the different time-frames and 
the different causes: In Zara’s case it is a particularly brutal form of capitalism, not 
communism, which is to blame; although both women do, of course, have their 
experience of oppressive patriarchal structures in common. Aliide does this even at the 
cost of giving up her own sense of invulnerability in both a literal and a metaphorical 
sense: She not only puts herself in harm’s way for Zara, but is also able to acknowledge 
the parallels between their experiences and acknowledge her own status as a moral 
agent by recognising her past wrongs. Aliide’s response to Zara can be understood in 
terms of what Michael Rothberg has called ‘multidirectional memory’, that is to say a 
form of memory in which victims see the recognition of their suffering not as excluding 
the representation of the suffering of others, but rather as part of a complex pattern of 
oppression in which parallels can be drawn between different historical constellations, 
without making those constellations interchangeable or creating a hierarchy among 
them. By recognizing these inter-relationships, Rothberg argues, victims can move from 
an exclusive focus on their own suffering, at the expense of paying attention to the 
plight of others, to a situation where they become sensitised to their responsibility for 
those others (Rothberg, 209: 265). 
In contrast, Oksanen criticises the emergence of a revived nationalism in the Estonia 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s, making repeated reference to local thugs who use 
patriotism as a pretext for their attacks on Aliide as a former communist or ‘tibla’ 
(Russkie) (83), as they write on her door. The paradox of the situation is that those 
young Estonians who now style themselves as victims of communist oppression 
(singing ‘it’s time […] to throw off our own slavery’, 88) threaten a woman whose 
affiliation to the communist cause was a matter of self-defence faced with her own 
brutalisation. The young nationalists bolster their own sense of identity by aggression 
towards a supposed foe, while denying the vulnerability of the individual attacked. An 
acknowledgement of common vulnerability across ethnic or ideological lines, not to 
mention a recognition one’s own nation’s implication in past wrongs, would make the 
binary of victim and perpetrator untenable, but this insight is warded off by their 
othering of Aliide in racial terms. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the novel proposes the exculpation of all of 
those vulnerable to victimization in the new political system. Oksanen also shows how 
other Estonians implicated in torture during the 1940s and 1950s seek to style 
themselves as victims of both the old and the new order, protesting when prosecuted 
that they were ‘just following orders’ (91). Here, Oksanen criticises those who fail to 
face up to their own complicity in violence and who adopt a self-defensive victim role, 
unable to emphasise with their own victims. Furthermore, by ending with the final 
revelations of Aliide’s complicity not only in her family’s deportation, but also in the 
arrest of two of Hans’ nationalist partisan colleagues (384), Oksanen does not allow her 
protagonist to be released from responsibility for these crimes. What the author does 
demonstrate, however, is that nationalist discourses of righteous victimhood obscure 
histories of human vulnerability and moral fallibility which might provide the basis of a 
form of solidarity which is not founded on exclusion and an unwillingness to address 
the complex relationship between suffering and culpability in the national past. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Sofi Oksanen’s Purge allows the reader to engage in an analysis of the position of the 
victims of historical political violence which refuses to portray them as ‘moral beacons.’ 
In line with recent scholarship on victimhood (as in the work by Bouris, Enns and 
Butler cited above), Oksanen shows how the experience of violence and suffering can 
also lead to problematic moral choices, making the victims of violence complicit with 
the very brutalisation they themselves have suffered. The text offers some hope in the 
form of a recognition of shared vulnerability across boundaries of nationality and 
ideology, and the construction of a ‘multidirectional memory’ in Rothberg’s terms, 
towards which Aliide is able to move at the end of the narrative. However, the 
possibility of new forms of solidarity on such a basis, as Butler and Rothberg would 
hope, remains tentative from the point of view of the perspectives offered by the novel 
itself: After all, the novel ends with Zara removing herself back to Russia and Aliide 
planning to put an end to her life, while nationalist ideology, with its self-righteous 
claim to ‘pure’ victimhood, continues to gain the upper hand. What Purge certainly does 
reject, however, is the re-founding of a nationalist community based on the clear 
division between noble victims and nefarious perpetrators. For this reason, it represents 
a valuable contribution to the critical interrogation of the political mobilisation of the 
notion of victimhood in the contemporary world. 
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